INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING AND IEEPA

20. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(2)(A) (international promotional money laundering) prohibits, in relevant part, the transportation, transmission, or transfer of funds or monetary instruments from or through a place outside of the United States to a place within the United States, with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D), specified unlawful activity includes violations of IEEPA, which is codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. In addition, any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in [Section 1956]” shall also be subject to criminal prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).

IEEPA

21. IEEPA authorizes the President of the United States to impose economic sanctions in response to an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. Pursuant to that authority, the President may declare a national emergency through an Executive Order to deal with that threat.
22. IEEPA makes it a crime to willfully violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or cause a violation of any order, license, regulation, or prohibition issued pursuant to IEEPA. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a), (c).
23. In 2014, pursuant to his authorities under IEEPA, the President issued Executive Order 13660, which declared a national emergency with respect to the situation in Ukraine. To address this national emergency, the President blocked all property and interest in property that were then or thereafter came within the United States or the possession or control of any United States person, of individuals determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to meet one or more enumerated criteria. These criteria include, but are not limited to, individuals determined to be responsible for or complicit in, or who engage in, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine; or who materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to individuals or entities engaging in such activities. Executive Order 13660 prohibits, among other things, transferring, paying, exporting, withdrawing, or otherwise dealing in any interest in property in the United States owned by a person whose property and interests in property are blocked (a “blocked person”), as well as the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by a United States person, to, or for the benefit of a blocked person, and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by a United States person from any such blocked person.
24. The President on multiple occasions has expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13660, including through: (1) Executive Order 13661, issued on March 16, 2014, which addresses the actions and policies of the Russian Federation with respect to Ukraine, including the deployment of Russian Federation military forces in the Crimea region of Ukraine; and (2) Executive Order 13662, issued on March 20, 2014, which addresses the actions and policies of the Government of the Russian Federation, including its purported annexation of Crimea and its use of force in Ukraine. Executive Orders 13660, 13661, and 13662 are collectively referred to as the “Ukraine-Related Executive Orders.” On February 21, 2022, the President again expanded the scope of the national emergency, finding that the Russian Federation’s purported recognition of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic regions of Ukraine contradicts Russia’s commitments under the Minsk agreements and threatens the peace, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
25. The Ukraine-Related Executive Orders authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President under IEEPA, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of those orders. The Ukraine-Related Executive Orders further authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to redelegate any of these functions to other offices and agencies of the United States Government.
26. To implement the Ukraine-Related Executive Orders, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued certain Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations. These regulations incorporate by reference the prohibited transactions set forth in the Ukraine-Related Executive Orders. See 31 C.ER. § 589.201. The regulations also provide that the names of persons designated directly by the Ukraine-Related Executive Orders, or by OFAC pursuant to the Ukraine-Related Executive Orders, whose property and interests are therefore blocked, are published in the Federal Register and incorporated into the SDNS and Blocked Persons List (the “SDN List”), which is published on OFAC’s website. ld. at note 2.
27. Among other things, E.O. 13661 prohibits United States persons from transferring, paying, exporting, withdrawing, or otherwise dealing in the property or interests in property of a designated person identified on the SDN List. E.O. 13661 § 1. These prohibitions incude the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of, a designated person identified on the SDN List. E.0. 13661 § 4. Any transaction that evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, or causes a violation of E.0. 13661 is further prohibited. Id. § 5. “United States person” is defined as a United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the law of the United State or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States. 31 C.FR. § 6(c).
28. On March 2, 2021, OFAC announced sanctions designating seven Russian government officials, including First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office Sergei KIRIYENKO, pursuant to E.0. 13661 for serving as officials of the Russian government. In so doing, OFAC noted that KIRIYENKO “is reported to be President Putin’s domestic policy curator.’”

29. On April 15, 2021, pursuant to his authorities under IEEPA, the President issued E.0.14024, which declared a national emergency with respect to:

[HJarmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation in particular, efforts to undermine the conduct of free and fair democratic elections and democratic institutions in the United States and its allies and partners; to engage in and facilitate malicious cyber-enabled activities against the United States and its allies and partners; to foster and use transnational corruption to influence foreign governments; to pursue extraterritorial activities targeting dissidents or journalists; to undermine security in countries and regions important to United States national security; and to violate well-established principles of international law, including respect for the territorial integrity of states constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.

Similar to the Ukraine-Related Executive Orders, E.O. 14024 blocked the property and interests in property of persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of State to meet one or more enumerated criteria and prohibited, among other things, the provision of funds, goods, or services by, to or for the benefit of such a designated person. To implement E.O. 14024, OFAC issued the “Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations,” 31 C.F.R. Part 587. Persons designated pursuant to E.0. 14024 are identified on the SDN List. Id. at note 1.

30. On February 22, 2022, OFAC announced additional sanctions against KIRIYENKO pursuant to E.0. 14024. With respect to KIRIYENKO, OFAC again described KIRIYENKO as “the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Office” and reportedly “Putin’s domestic policy curator.” OFAC noted KIRIYENKO had previously “served as the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and as the General Director of Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation” and had been previously designated pursuant to E.0. 13661 in March 2021. Pursuant to E.0. 14024, OFAC redesignated KIRIYENKO for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the Russian government.
31. On March 20, 2024, OFAC designated GAMBASHIDZE and TUPIKIN, as well as SDA and STRUCTURA, pursuant to Executive Order 14024 for “being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of SDA and Structura” and *for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly” for the Russian government. In announcing the sanctions, the Treasury Department stated, We are committed to exposing Russia’s extensive campaigns of government-directed deception, which are intended to mislead voters and undermine trust in democratic institutions in the United States and around the world.” OFAC explained that GAMBASHIDZE, TUPIKIN, SDA, and STRUCTURA:

[W]ere involved in a persistent foreign malign influence campaign at the direction of the Russian Presidential Administration. SDA and Structura have been identified as key actors of the campaign, responsible for providing GoR with a variety of services, including the creation of websites designed to impersonate government organizations and legitimate media outlets in Europe.

Leading into Fall 2022, Tupikin and Gambashidze implemented a campaign that impersonated news websites, staged videos, and fake social media accounts. Specifically, Tupikin and Gambashidze, via SDA and Structura, have implemented, on behalf of GoR, a sprawling network of over 60 websites that impersonated legitimate news organizations, and which used misleading social media accounts to amplify the content of the spoofed websites. The fake websites appeared to have been built to carefully mimic the appearance of legitimate news websites. The fake websites included embedded images and working links to legitimate sites and even used the impersonated site’s cookie acceptance page.

32. SDA and STRUCTURA, both of which were founded by GAMBASHIDZE, are Russian companies headquartered at adjacent buildings in Moscow. SDA is a public relations company, specializing in election campaigns, with deep ties to the Russian government. SDA’s website notes the work it has done for the Russian Duma, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as multiple other Russian government entities. According to its website, STRUCTURA is a technology company with experience using bots, offering website design, and coordinating information systems among other services. STRUCTURA’s website also highlights the work it has done for the Russian government and lists the same Russian government clients as SDA.
33. According to OFAC records, at no time has KIRIYENKO, GAMBASHIDZE,[i] SDA, TUPIKIN, or STRUCTURA, or any of the individuals or entities described below, including individuals known to have worked at their direction, obtained a license or other written authorization to purchase, renew, transfer, use, or export the SUBJECT DOMAINS.

[i] On March 20, 2024, Special Agents of the FBI interviewed a member of GAMBASHIDZE’s family who is a U.S. citizen and alerted the family member to the sanctions. In a follow up interview on April 3, 2024, the family member confirmed they had spoken with GAMBASHIDZE regarding the sanctions after their interview with the FBI. The family member confirmed GAMBASHIDZE was aware of the sanctions and that GAMBASHIDZE claimed “what they say about me is not completely true.”